A convertible authenticated encryption scheme is very useful for transmitting a confidential message in insecure communication networks. This paper proposes a convertible authenticated encryption scheme with message linkages for message flows using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). The proposed scheme has the following advantages. (1) It can provide non-repudiation when the signer repudiates his/her signature by adding conversion phase. (2) It can greatly reduce computation efforts for that the tasks of verifying the signature and authenticating the public key can be simultaneously carried out in one step. (3) 
Introduction
A convertible authenticated encryption scheme is very useful for transmitting a confidential message in insecure communication networks. In the convertible authenticated encryption scheme, the signer could generate a signature for a message and then send it to a specified receiver. After receiving the signature, only the receiver could recover and verify the message. Some convertible authenticated encryption schemes and signcryption schemes are proposed to achieve the above purpose [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] .
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) first introduced by Koblitz [13] and Miller [14] . The ECC is especially applicable to the applications of mobile devices with the limited computing power and insufficient storage space. A significant characteristic of the ECC is that the key length is shorter than that of the conventional cryptography (e.g. RSA) under the same level of security, which helps faster execution and more bandwidth savings [15] . This paper proposes a secure and efficient convertible authenticated encryption scheme with message linkages for message flows using ECC. The proposed scheme consists of four phases: the system initialization phase, the signing phase, the message recovery phase, and the conversion phase. The proposed scheme can provide non-repudiation when the signer repudiates his/her signature by adding conversion phase. In addition, the proposed scheme can greatly reduce computation efforts for that the tasks of verifying the signature and authenticating the public key can be simultaneously carried out in one step. Moreover, the proposed scheme is practical because it not only provides computational efficiency but also achieves all security requirements. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the proposed scheme. Sections 3 and 4 analyze security and performance of the proposed scheme. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 5.
The Proposed Scheme
This section proposes a secure and efficient convertible authenticated encryption scheme with message linkages using ECC. The proposed scheme consists of four phases: the system initialization phase, the signing phase, the message recovery phase, and the conversion phase. In the scheme, the signature only needs be recovered and verified by the specified receiver in the normal procedure. Later, if the signer repudiates the signature, the receiver can reveal the converted signature for verifying. The flow chart of the proposed signature generation phase and message recovery phase is illustrated in Fig. 1 and performs as follows. 
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System initialization phase
The System Authority (SA) selects a finite field F q , an elliptic curve E, defined over that field and a base point P with order n. The order of group of points in E(F p ) should be divisible by a large prime n. Let h(·) be a secure one-way hash function. The SA publishes n, P , E(F p ), and h(·). Each user U i owns a private key x i ∈ [1, n−1] and calculates the corresponding public key y i = x i P . Let U a be the signer and U b be the receiver.
Signing phase
When the signer U a wants to send the authenticated encrypted message M to a designated recipient U b , he/she divides the message M into the sequence
. Then, the signer U a performs the following operations to create the signature blocks for the message M.
1. Pick a random number k with 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 and set r 0 = 0.
2. Compute t = kP .
Compute
4. Compute
for i = 1, 2, ..., n, where || denotes the concatenation operator. Note that r i is used as a linking parameter between the ith and (i + 1)th message block.
where r = h(r 1 ||r 2 ||...||r n ||sk).
Finally, U a sends (n + 4) signature blocks (v, t, s, r, r 1 , r 2 , ..., r n ) to U b via a public channel.
Message recovery phase
After receiving the signature blocks (v, t, s, r, r 1 , r 2 , ..., r n ), U b performs the following operations on them to recover the message blocks {M 1 , M 2 , ..., M n }. 
Compute
for i = 1, 2, ..., n and r 0 = 0.
5. Verify the signature with the following equality:
If the equation does, the signature is valid.
Conversion phase
If U a repudiates the signature, U b confirms the dishonesty of the signer by revealing the converted signature (v, s, r) for the message M. With the converted signature, third party (referee) can easily conform its validity using the above Eq. (8) as follows:
Security Analysis
This section discusses the security features of the proposed scheme. First, the security terms [16] needed for the analysis of the proposed scheme are defined as follows:
Definition 3.1 The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is as follows: for two points P, Q ∈ E(F q )
, determine the scalar k ∈ Z n such that kP = Q where n = E(F q ).
Definition 3.2 A secure one-way hash function y = h(x) is the following: Given x to compute y is easy and given y to compute x is hard.
In considering the above definitions, the followings are used to analyze the security of the proposed scheme.
Correctness of Eqs. (6) and (9)
The proposed scheme can work correctly by checking the followings. In the message recovery phase, the receiver U b can recover the message using Eq. (6). According to Eq. (6), we have
In the conversion phase, the converted signature (v, s, r) for the message M can be verified by Eq. (9). According to Eq. (9), we have
As a result, we see that the proposed scheme works correctly to recover original message M and verify the converted signature.
Resistance to forgery attack
In the proposed scheme, an adversary cannot forge valid signature blocks that can pass the recipient's verification. In the proposed scheme, U b always check the integrity of the recovered message blocks M = {M 1 , M 2 , ..., M n } by performing the verification operation v ? = h(M||t ) based on Eq. (8) . As a result, meaningless messages by the forgery attack can be easily detected by the recipient U b .
Resistance to private key revealing attack
In the proposed scheme, an adversary cannot try to reveal U a 's private key x a or U b 's private key x b from the known information. With the knowledge of public keys y a and y b , the adversary should face the difficult of breaking the ECDLP to obtain the private keys x a and x b . With the knowledge of signature (n + 4) signature blocks (v, t, s, r, r 1 , r 2 , . .., r n ), the adversary has no ability to reveals the secret key x a , which is based on ElGamal signature scheme. Note that the random number k should be secret and different for generating each signature. Otherwise, the adversary can easily reveal the private key x a in Equation (3).
Resistance to message revealing attack
In the proposed scheme, an adversary cannot try to reveal the message M. The session value sk = kx b P can be computed as ky b and x b t by the signer and the recipient, respectively. To reveal the message M, it is difficult because the number k is randomly generated by the signer and x b is the recipient's private key. On the other hand, the converted signature blocks (v, t, s, r, r 1 , r 2 , . .., r n ) does not expose the message M, which is protect under secure one-way hash function h(·) as h(M||t). Table 1 lists the detailed performance evaluation of the proposed scheme. The following notations are used in Table 1: • T em is the time for a modular multiplication computation over an elliptic curve;
Performance Evaluation
• T ea is the time for a modular addition computation over an elliptic curve;
• T m is the time for a modular multiplication computation;
• T xor is the time for a bit-wise exclusive-or computation;
• T h is the time for a one-way hash function h(·) computation;
• |x| is the bit-length of an integer x;
In the proposed scheme, the signer requires 2T em +1T m +(n+2)T h +nT xor to generate the message blocks, while verifying and retrieving the message blocks requires 3T em + 1T ea + (n − 1) + (n + 2)T h + nT xor . In the conversion phase, the third party (referee) requires 2T em + 1T ea + 1T h to verify the converted signature. Finally, the communication cost in the proposed scheme is (n + 1)|F q | + 1|n| + 2|h| bits. 
Conclusions
This paper proposed a secure and efficient convertible authenticated encryption scheme with message linkages for message flows using ECC. By security and performance analysis, we showed that the proposed scheme is not only secure against various cryptographic attacks, but also more efficient than previously proposed schemes. Hence, we believe that it is more suitable in some practical scenarios.
